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 1
HOW TO ESTABLISH FLYING THE CONFEDERATE FLAG WITH THE STATE AS SPONSOR 
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
by 
 
L. Darnell Weeden* 
 
“Who would have thought that America would start the third millennium 
with the  Confederate battle flag as an issue in the presidential campaign?  
. . .  Now I hope and pray that the South I love can move on, can prove 
William Faulkner wrong when he said, ‘In the South the past is never 
dead.  It’s not even the past .”’1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue to be addressed is whether it is constitutionally permissible under the Equal  
Protection Clause2 for a state to fly a Confederate flag over its state capitol dome or other  
public property. 3   
Like many of the South’s ghosts of the past slavery, racial discrimination, and race 
relations in general, the battle over the Confederate flag continues to impact national politics and 
rages on about the state of South Carolina.4 South Carolina is again the catalyst for a conflict 
about Southern Confederate values.5 South Carolina, the first state to secede from the Union and 
the only state where the Confederate flag still files above its capitol, has created a flag 
                                                                 
* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., University of Mississippi.   
I would like to thank Professor Alfreda Sellers Diamond of Southern University Law Center for providing 
commentary on a very early draft of this article as a work-in-progress at the Fourth Annual Northeastern People of 
Color Legal Scholarship Conference hosted by the University of Puerto Rico Law School. 
1 Elaine H. Owens, Editorial, This Proud Southerner Says Strike The Flag; Its Symbolism has been lost to Racism, 
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, at A7. Elaine Owens is a white high school English teacher. Id. 
Owens describes herself as “a Southern Woman, proud to be Southern, with family roots that stretch back to the 
1600s in Virginia and North Carolina. Still, I will never display the Confederate battle flag, nor will I condone 
others doing so . . . .  I do not approach this issue as an ‘outsider’. I have 10 ancestors in my direct family line who 
fought for the Confederacy . . . .”  Id.  
2 U.S. CONST . amend. XIV provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. 
3 Dahleen Glanton, A Vivid Reminder Across South, Rebel Flag Breeds Pride, Contempt, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1999, 
at 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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controversy. The controversy has pitted blacks against whites, Republicans against Democrats, 
and conservatives against liberals, just as the Civil War did more than a century ago.6 An 
emotional national controversy concerning South Carolina’s flying of the Confederate battle flag, 
with its state flag and the United States flag over its state capitol, entered the 2000 presidential 
campaign. 7  There was not any protest about South Carolina flying the United States and state 
flag.  On Monday, January 17, 2000, tens of thousands of Americans marched to protest South 
Carolina’s practice of flying the Confederate flag over its state capitol. 8 On Wednesday, April 
12, 2000, Serena Williams, U.S. Open champion, withdrew from the Family Circle Cup tennis 
tournament at Hilton Head Island to protest South Carolina’s flying of the Confederate flag. 9  I 
believe that a state’s removal of the flag from its state capitol will not defeat a constitutional 
challenge to a state sponsorship of the Confederate flag anywhere as a symbol for systematic 
racist speech and conduct.10 
In Mississippi, the state flag has bars of red, white, and blue in one corner, and the 
Confederate battle flag in another corner.11  Mississippi’s flag dates back to 1894.12  In May of 
1999, the Mississippi Supreme Court revived a six-year-old challenge by the NAACP to the 
Confederate design of the state flag. 13 The Mississippi State Supreme Court will be asked to 
examine constitutional implications of flying the state flag. 14   
                                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Voice of the Times , ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 27, 2000, at 9B. 
8 Flags Much in the News, and Much Abused as Metaphors; From Congress to South Carolina to Waldo County, 
Banners Become Controversial, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 21, 2000, at 13A.  
9 S. Williams Joins S.C. Flag Boycott, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2000, at 1C (“Wednesday evening, the Senate voted 
36-37, with Republicans dissenting to remove the flag. The bill moves to the Democrat-controlled full Senate today 
[Thursday].”). 
10 Charles Lawrence believes racial segregation was about speech as well as conduct. Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He 
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-44.  
11 Steve Kraske, et al., Ashcroft, Bond Rebut Allegations of Racism, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 23, 1999, at A1. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
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During the presidential campaign, candidates Governor Bush and Senator McCain were 
accused of falling short of persuasively projecting moral leadership when it appeared that they 
were attempting to remain neutral or silent on the Confederate flag issue.15 Bruce Fein stated, 
“[w]hat is needed is more courage and less profile from Republican presidential aspirants George 
W. Bush and John McCain who have cravenly professed agnosticism on the question” 16 of 
whether South Carolina should fly the Confederate flag over its state capitol. Fein said for 
presidential candidates to avoid their obligation to take a position on the South Carolina 
Confederate flag issue, like Bush and McCain have under the feeble banner of states’ rights, is an 
uncourageous evasion. 17 Fein took the position that both Bush and McCain should deliver 
sermons against South Carolina because displaying the flag is a race-based insult to many 
Americans because the state’s conduct demonstrates tacit complacency with racial 
discrimination. 18  Fein believes presidents, for good or ill, are moral leaders. Fein thinks Bush 
and McCain would have demonstrated presidential moral leadership concerning race relations by 
denouncing South Carolina’s flying of the Confederate flag as an ill-conceived idea.19 
John McCain was accused of being both opportunistic and cowardly because of his ever-
changing positions on the Confederate flag. 20  Republican presidential hopeful Governor George 
                                                                 
15 Bruce Fein, Commentary, More Courage, Less Profile, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at A13. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. (“Presidential moral leadership regarding race relations today is even more urgent. James Byrd, Abner 
Louima, Abidou Diallo, O.J. Simpson, Rodney King and race profiling generally are emblematic. The Confederate 
flag issue fits on that troublesome tapestry.”).  
20 Gerald Warner, Rallying to Today’s Dull Colours Fails to Fire the Imagination, SCOT . ON SUNDAY, Jan. 16, 
2000, at 16.  Mr. Warner has noted that: 
The flag is an issue because McCain made it so.  Last Sunday, speaking on a current affairs 
program, McCain said that the Confederate flag was a ‘symbol of racism and slavery’ and he 
described it as offensive.  These remarks were prompted by a campaign by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured  People to stop the Confederate flag being flown 
over the state government building in South Carolina.   
Id. 
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Bush says he is contemplating the NAACP’s request to remove the image of the Confederate 
battle flag from the Texas Supreme Court building. 21  
Democrats Vice-President Al Gore and Senator Bill Bradley were critics of South 
Carolina’s flying of the Confederate flag during the course of the presidential campaign.22  
There is no doubt that the Confederate flag issue has received a great deal of recent media 
coverage because of South Carolina. The new attention given to the Confederate flag issue as 
part of our national political debate requires federal and state courts to recognize that state 
sponsorship of the Confederate flag violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.23 The Confederate flag violates equal protection because intentional state 
sponsorship of it burdens all Americans – including insular and discrete minorities – with race-
based conduct.24  
In 1990, a federal appellate court held that the state of Alabama did not violate the United 
States Constitution by flying the Confederate flag over the state’s capitol.25  The Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiffs in Hunt were not denied equal protection because all citizens were 
exposed to the flag and citizens of all races were offended by this position. 26   
The state of South Carolina’s act of flying the flag is properly viewed as a race-based 
symbol directed at everyone including discrete and insular minorities, and is subject to a more 
                                                                 
21 Greg Pierce, Inside Politics,  WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at A5; see also  Paul Duggan, Texas Removes 
Confederate Symbols from Court, WASH. POST , June 13, 2000, at A21. 
22 Mike Downey, Let There be no Wavering over not Waving this Flag, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at A3. 
23 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.   
U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1. 
24 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).  
25 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990). 
26 Id. at 1562. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss2/2
 5
exacting judicial scrutiny under an Equal Protection Clause analysis.27  South Carolina’s policy 
of flying the Confederate flag violates the Equal Protection Clause because it is a racial 
classification that burdens insular and discrete minorities and race-neutral advocates with the 
race-based pro slavery symbol in the state’s ordinary political processes.28 In 1993, Alabama’s 
Governor, Jim Folson, ordered that the Confederate battle flag no longer fly over the state capitol 
dome.29  Folson raised the United States and state flags and ordered that the battle flag be flown 
across the street at the first White House of the Confederacy. 30 It may be permissible under the 
Equal Protection Clause to use the flag at the first White House of the Confederacy if it qualifies 
as an historic exhibit.  However, the state should not be allowed to sponsor the flag as symbolic 
racially discriminatory political speech. It is clear from prior Supreme Court decisions that 
conduct may be utilized as a method of communicating ideas because “the medium can be the 
message.”31 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court concluded that the 
flag as a symbol is a primitive, but effective way of communicating ideas.32 The Supreme Court 
recognized, almost 60 years ago, that a flag could symbolize a system as a shortcut from mind to 
mind.33 The message of the Confederate flag as a symbol on state property sends a message that 
the state endorses the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,34 and sends a message 
of white supremacy in the political process and halls of government. This article disagrees with 
                                                                 
27 Id. at 1555.  
28 Id. In Carolene Products, Justice Stone asked “whether prejudice against discrete and ‘insular minorities’ may be 
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  Carolene 
Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.  Some constitutional scholars believe that Justice Stone provided one of the most 
important footnotes in Constitutional Law in Carolene Products by suggesting that the courts had a duty to keep the 
political process open to insular and discrete minorities.  JEROME A. BARRON, ET  AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 590 (5th ed. 1996). 
29 Confederate Flag Removed in Alabama, WASH. POST , Apr. 30, 1993, at A47. 
30 Id. 
31 BARRON, supra  note 28, at 956. 
32 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
33 Id. 
34 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the position taken by the Hunt Court.35  I agree very strongly with the position taken by James 
Forman, Jr., that a state flying a Confederate flag over its state capitol violates the Equal 
Protection Clause because of the discriminatory intent.36 
Part I of this article provides a brief introduction to the flying of the Confederate flag 
controversy. Part II reviews how the discriminatory intent analysis impacts the Confederate flag 
flying over a state capitol or other public facilities.  Part III concedes that footnote four in 
Carolene Products serves as a basis for judicial intervention under the Equal Protection Clause 
to ensure that South Carolina’s political marketplace does not continue to malfunction against its 
racial minorities by flying the Confederate flag over the state capitol. 37 However, Part III 
emphasizes the rationale of Adrarand Constructors v. Pena,38 in which the Court made it clear 
that the Equal Protection Clause is designed to protect individuals regardless of their group 
status. Part IV analyzes the implications of Adarand39 on the rationale articulated in Coleman v. 
Miller40 and the Confederate flag legacy. Part V suggests that courts should hold that state 
sponsorship of the Confederate flag violates equal protection because, in actual practice, the flag 
is a race-based symbol. Finally, this article concludes that the Confederate flag appeals to a 
prurient interest in race relations. 
                                                                 
35 See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990). 
36 James Forman, Jr., Note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 
YALE L.J. 505 (1991). 
37  Barron noted that: 
Professor Ely has employed the Carolene Products footnote as a predicate for justifying judicial 
intervention under the Equal Protection Clause to ensure that the political processes whereby 
values are identified and accommodated are not unduly restricted because of prejudice.  However, 
the mere fact that a group loses in the political marketplace does not mean the representative 
system of government is malfunctioning. 
Barron, supra  note 28, at 591. 
38 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
39 Id. 
40 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1011 (1998). 
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II. THE CONFEDERATE FLAG AND THE ISSUE OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT 
A person living in South Carolina wanting to challenge the state’s ability to fly the 
Confederate flag over the state capitol must first demonstrate that the flying of the flag 
constitutes discriminatory intent on the basis of race.41 The Supreme Court made it explicitly 
clear that discriminatory impact alone would not serve as a basis for a violation of equal 
protection of the laws.42  Forman correctly writes that a court properly applying the 
discriminatory intent standard will have little doubt in concluding that racial slavery and 
discrimination are significant original factors in a former Confederate state’s decision to sponsor 
the Confederate flag. 43   
In December of 1999, Armstrong Williams stated that the flag of the illegal Confederate 
State of America currently waves over South Carolina’s state capitol.44 The message of the 
Confederate flag is not that of the Star-Spangled Banner American flag. 45  The state sponsorship 
of a waving Confederate flag evokes images of the act of treason committed at Fort Sumter, 
                                                                 
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).  In Washington, the Court decided that, in order to hold the 
government liable for racial discrimination under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff had to 
show discriminatory intent. Id.   
42 Id. 
43 Forman, supra  note 36, at 507.  Mr. Forman noted that: 
A plaintiff challenging government policy under the Equal Protection Clause bears the burden of 
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that racial discrimination was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the adoption of the policy.  Since determining the "motivation behind official 
action is often a problematic undertaking," courts must look to the context in which actions were 
taken in order to evaluate the discriminatory intent claim.  Accordingly, "determining whether 
invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."  Such an inquiry might include: 
(1) evidence of disparate impact; (2) "the historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it 
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes"; (3) "the specific sequence of 
events leading up to the challenged decision"; and (4) legislative or administrative history, 
especially contemporaneous statements of decisionmakers about their reasons.  
Under this discriminatory intent standard, there can be little doubt that racial 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the Southern States' decisions to hoist Confederate flags.  
Examining the "sequence of events" in Alabama, for example, shows that the Confederate flag 
was raised as a symbol of white defiance to court-ordered integration.   
Id. (citations omitted). 
44 Armstrong Williams, Commentary, Refolding Rite for the Confederate Flag , WASH. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at B4.  
45 Id. 
7
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South Carolina, in April of 1861.46 People who support the Confederate flag flying over South 
Carolina’s state capitol are victims of revisionist history. 47 The revisionist have it wrong, the 
Confederate States of America was not established to defend the constitutional rights of 
Southerners.48 Preservation of race-based slavery was the overwhelming motivation for 
secession by South Carolina and for others joining the Confederate States of America.49 The 
twentieth century should end with the truth about the purpose of the Confederacy by taking the 
Confederate flag off of the state capitol.50 A state’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag 
communicates a disgraceful justification for enslaving an entire race.51  A primary goal of the 
Equal Protection Clause is to prevent intentional governmental conduct that discriminates on the 
basis of race.52  In its discriminatory intent analysis, the Court in Washington v. Davis stated that 
an invidious discriminatory purpose is inferable from the totality of relevant facts.53  According 
to Justice Stevens, the best probative evidence of intentional discrimination is objective evidence 
of what actually happened, rather than evidence of the subjective state of mind of the state as an 
actor.54  
In his superior note, Forman does an excellent job of identifying objective probative 
evidence that states use the Confederate flag as a symbol of white supremacy. 55 The flag’s force 
as a symbol of racial oppression comes from its history. 56 The first symbolic role for the flag was 
                                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Williams, supra  note 44. 
51 Id.  
52 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985) (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)). 
53 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).  
54 Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
55 Forman, supra note 36, at 513.  
56 Id. 
8
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to motivate Confederate troops headed into battle to fight.57  The rebels in the Confederate army 
were fighting for slavery. 58  The South fought to protect a lifestyle of reducing African-
Americans to chattel, without any basic human rights.59 For African-Americans, the Southern 
way of life meant being forced to work and live in the inhuman conditions created by Southern 
slave masters.60 History clearly reveals that the symbolic Confederate flag glorifies and 
memorializes this immoral slavery and shameful system of racial exploitation. 61  
Forman correctly points out that the Confederate flag represents more than the Civil War 
and is an official endorsement of slavery. 62 The flag also stands for a history of vocal resistance 
to racial and political equality for African-Americans and other minorities.63 The Ku Klux Klan, 
skinheads, and other white supremacists opposed to racial justice under the Constitution used the 
Confederate flag on a regular basis throughout the twentieth century. 64 Government officials 
                                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Forman, supra  note 36, at 513.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  One commentator noted that “[e]xamples of the Confederate flag as a symbol of white supremacists are 
legion.  Tom Metzger, the former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan and leader of the White Aryan Resistance, 
who was recently ordered to pay $12.5 million in damages for his role in the killing of a black man in Oregon, flew 
the flag above his home.”  John M. Glionna, Unfavorite Son, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at E1.  Ku Klux Klan and 
neo-Nazi protestors demonstrating outside the national headquarters of the NAACP carried a Confederate flag along 
with signs saying "Nuke the NAACP."  Paul W. Valentine, Police Boost Security at NAACP, WASH. POST , Jan. 5, 
1990, at C1.  Two hundred members of the neo-Nazi, Aryan Nations organization carrying Confederate flags and 
wearing Klan robes and Nazi uniforms commemorated Confederate war hero Sam Davis' birthday in Pulaski, 
Tennessee, the birthplace of the Klan.  Town Closes Shops to Protest Neo-Nazi March, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at 
A28.  A group of Los Angeles skinheads, wearing Confederate flag tattoos, attacked a Middle Eastern couple and 
baby in a supermarket parking lot.  Ashley Dunn & Jeffrey Miller, "I had to Stop it," Says Guard who Held off 
Alleged "Skinheads" , L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1989, at B1. A group of 50 white racists and skinheads celebrated an 
"Aryan Woodstock"; many of them wore the Confederate flag, as well as other racist and anti-Semitic symbols.  
Dan Morain & Robert Chow, Rain Dampens Event as Foes Outnumber "Skinheads" at Rally, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
1989, at A3.  The Imperial Wizard of the Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, J. W. Farrands, 
sporting a Confederate flag button on his lapel, flew from his home in Connecticut to California to protest Martin 
Luther King's birthday.  Louis Sahagun, Marchers in Fontana Fete King, Draw Klan Taunts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 
1988, at A3.  Members of the Ku Klux Klan have marched from the Washington Monument to the Capitol carrying 
a Confederate flag and chanting, "We are the KKK."  Mary Jordan & Linda Wheeler, 14 Hurt as Anti-Klan 
Protestors Clash with Police, WASH. POST , Oct. 29, 1990, at A1; see also  Forman, supra  note 36, at 513 n.57. 
9
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promoting black subordination adopted the Confederate flag. 65 In 1963, Alabama’s Governor 
George Wallace’s “Segregation Forever” campaign included raising the Confederate flag. 66  
 It is more than clear that objective evidence established a pattern of state actors using the 
flag for racially discriminatory purposes. The Supreme Court’s discriminatory-purpose 
requirement has the practical effect of denying African-Americans and other discrete and insular 
minorities strict scrutiny protection under an Equal Protection analysis: “The Supreme Court 
requires a showing of impermissible purpose as a precondition for more stringent judicial 
review.”67  This discriminatory intent requirement has been under attack.  According to David 
Strauss, discriminatory intent raises some serious questions, “[i]f explicit racial classifications 
are unlawful, it makes little sense to allow a government that is subtle enough  to use an 
ostensibly neutral surrogate for race to get away with maintaining the Jim Crow regime.”68 There 
is nothing ostensibly racially neutral about South Carolina’s use of the Confederate flag. In 1956, 
South Carolina Senator John D. Long, an avowed race-based segregationist, introduced the 
resolution that convinced the all-white Senate to hang a Confederate battle flag in its chambers.69   
Earlier, in 1938, while serving as a Democrat in the South Carolina House of Representatives, 
Long persuaded members of that body to raise the Confederate flag in its House.70  The South 
Carolina Senate and House journals do not contain any record of a debate when the flag went up 
over the state capitol.71 However, the South Carolina journals provide many clues about Long’s 
                                                                 
65 Forman, supra  note 36, at 513-14.  Officials redesigned the Georgia state flag to resemble the Confederate flag 
after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), outlawing racial segregation 
in public schools. “At approximately the same time, South Carolina raised the flag above the state capitol.” Id. at 
514 n.58.  
66 Forman, supra  note 36, at 514. 
67 BARRON, supra  note 28, at 599. 
68 David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 948 (1989). 
69 Tim Smith, Banner Traced to One Man, Work of Single Racially Motivated Lawmaker Brought Rise of 
Confederate Flag to Chambers, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 30, 2000, at B2.   
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
10
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motives for flying the flag in South Carolina’s House and Senate chambers.72 Long’s motives for 
raising the flag included his fierce opposition to the federal effort to enforce civil rights for 
African-Americans.73 
 In a 1960 speech celebrating the secession centennial, Long told members of the South 
Carolina Senate that the original Ku Klux Klan should be praised and remembered for the 
sacrifices it has made for our country. 74 Long gave a speech to the South Carolina Senate about 
Ku Klux Klan members: “We honor them and we are proud of them. We will defend them from 
defamation to the death.”75 During the same speech, Long challenged senators to “dismiss from 
your consideration any little-sister sob stories about the South’s brutality to the slave and its 
inhuman treatment of captive and fugitive slaves.” 76  
 Long opposed with vigor people and governmental entities involved in desegregating 
public schools.77 In 1960, he also introduced a measure to ask Congress to convene a 
Constitutional Convention for the purpose of repealing the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal 
Protection Clause which made public school segregation illegal.78  Long criticized the United 
States Supreme Court for rejecting the separate-but-equal doctrine and requiring school 
desegregation. 79 He introduced a resolution asking Congress to impeach members of the 
Supreme Court for outlawing segregation in public schools.80  In 1959, Long said South Carolina 
                                                                 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Smith, supra  note 69. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
11
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plans to continue segregation in public schools regardless of the Supreme Court ruling outlawing 
school segregation. 81 
 It is important to know the historical context of South Carolina’s and Senator Long’s 
motivation for using the Confederate flag because such a contextual inquiry clearly demonstrates 
evidence of discriminatory intent under Hunter v. Underwood.82 Alabama law denied two state 
citizens, one African-American and one white, the right to vote because each was convicted of 
presenting a worthless check, a crime involving moral turpitude in the state.83 The Supreme 
Court held the Alabama law – which, on its face and in a race-neutral manner disenfranchised all 
voters – to be unconstitutional because the law had a disproportionately adverse impact on 
African-Americans and was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose when it was 
enacted.84  In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the 
Supreme Court stated that discovering whether invidious discriminatory governmental purpose 
exists requires a sensitive inquiry into any available circumstantial and direct evidence.85 The 
direct evidence of Senator Long’s purpose for flying the flag in the state’s capitol is ostensibly 
race-based.86 The objective, circumstantial evidence clearly suggests beyond a reasonable doubt 
that South Carolina’s legislature supported Long’s historically and constitutionally significant 
race-based motives for sponsoring the Confederate flag on state property. 87 A court’s careful 
inquiry into South Carolina’s legislative history and the contemporaneous statements of Senator 
Long about using the Confederate flag as a symbol or resistance to racial equality for African-
                                                                 
81 Smith, supra  note 69. 
82 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 268 (1985). 
83 Id. at 223. 
84 Id. at 222. 
85 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
86 Smith, supra  note 69.  
87 Id. 
12
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Americans will establish an intent to discriminate.88 The Supreme Court in Hunter approved the 
use of testimony of historians to establish that, in 1901, the Alabama Constitutional Convention 
had the discriminatory purpose of denying African-Americans the right to vote.89  Although 
Hunter involved discriminatory intent under a state’s enacted law, it is still controlling in 
situations where the state chooses to fly the Confederate flag over its public buildings under the 
rationale articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Hunt.90 In Hunt, the Court stated that state action 
could exist by tradition even though there was no state statute authorizing the flying of the 
Confederate flag in Alabama.91 The court in Hunt correctly concluded that a Confederate flag 
flown on the state capitol dome is flown under the color of state law. 92  
 
III. INDIVIDUAL ENTITLEMENT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW UNDER ADARAND 
 
In 1938, Justice Stone coined the phrase “discrete and insular minorities” in footnote four 
of the Carolene Products opinion. 93 Justice Stone’s footnote four is now regarded as the basis for 
strict scrutiny judicial review.94 This footnote has been used as a justification for judicial 
intervention to protect discrete and insular minorities from flaws in the democratic political 
                                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985). 
90 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990). 
91 Id.  Alabama raised the Confederate flag in 1961 to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Civil War. Id. at 1557-
58. On April 25, 1963, the day United States Attorney General Robert Kennedy came to Montgomery, Alabama, to 
discuss with Governor George Wallace the governor’s announced intention to block the admission of the first 
African-Americans to the University of Alabama, the Confederate flag was raised again and flown continuously for 
many years. Id. at 1558.  
92 Id. at 1562. In order to prove a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the Confederate 
flag is flown by individuals acting under the cloak authority; id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 
(1961)), and (2) the plaintiff must show that flying the flag deprives her of some right, privilege, or immunity 
secured by the constitution or by law. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).   
93 Lewis F. Powell Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982);  see also United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
94 Powell, supra  note 93. 
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process.95 The theory for judicial intervention has been that the political process cannot be 
trusted to protect certain minority groups in the same way that it protects others.96 Membership 
in a discrete and insular minority class is not necessary to challenge a state’s racially 
discriminatory practice of flying the Confederate flag because, under Adarand, any individual, 
without regard to her racial group history, may challenge the state’s explicit race-based conduct 
as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.97 It is good public policy to have the 
Supreme Court treat all race-based governmental decisions as inherently suspect because any 
competent lawyer can make a plausible argument that a certain group is a discrete and insular 
minority. 98  By not limiting suspect racial classifications to insular and discrete minorities, the 
Supreme Court avoids the battle of the minorities while granting people of all races strict 
scrutiny equal protection under Adarand.99 A Confederate flag flying over public buildings in 
South Carolina serves as a symbol of continued commitment to the race-based views of Senator 
Long and violates the Equal Protection Clause because it continues to send to every person the 
message that race matters in the political community. 100 The flying of the Confederate flag as a 
race-based act may affect people’s hearts and minds on a personal and individual level in a way 
unlikely to be undone because the flag unnecessarily taints governmental conduct with racism.101 
A state flying the Confederate flag over its public buildings creates state sponsorship of either a 
feeling of racial superiority or racial inferiority in individuals on a personal basis in a public area 
                                                                 
95 Id. at 1088. 
96 Id. 
97 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211-23 (1973). 
98 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (“Our society, consisting of over 200 
million individuals of multitudinous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse.  It 
would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in  the 
road.”). 
99 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211-23. 
100 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
101 Id. 
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where the state should be race neutral.102 It is clear that if a state displays a flag with the bold 
message “[t]his state government is for white supremacy because of our Southern heritage, but 
we are not prejudiced,” its flag violates the Equal Protection Clause.103 According to Professor 
Burcham, the intentional conduct of displaying this explicit racist message would associate the 
government directly with values totally antithetical to core constitutional values by delivering a 
potent message of government endorsement of race-based values.104  I agree with Professor 
Burcham’s thoughtful analysis that a state’s design of a school curriculum inculcating the value 
of white supremacy violates the Speech Clause of the First Amendment.105  I assert that such a 
message also violates the Equal Protection Clause; I do not address the First Amendment issues 
in this article.106  A message of white supremacy endorsed by the state on its capitol dome or any 
other state property, whether stated in words or by the well-understood symbolism of the 
Confederate flag, violates the Equal Protection Clause.  It communicates a stigmatic message 107 
to an individual that he or she is inherently unequal in the community because of  racial 
preference given to supporters of the flag, rather than a position of race neutrality by not 
                                                                 
102 Id. 
103 David W. Burcham, School Desegregation and the First Amendment, 59 ALB. L. REV. 213 (1995). 
104 Id. at 241. 
105 Id. 
106 As Professor Burcham stated: 
Were a school to construct a curriculum, as hypothesized at the beginning of this Article, designed 
to inculcate the "value" of white supremacy, the conduct would assuredly run afoul of the students' 
Speech Clause right. The purposeful conduct would associate the government directly with values 
totally antithetical to core constitutional values, delivering a potent message of government 
endorsement of the racist values.  Similarly, a school that displayed the Confederate flag, other 
than in textbooks or other curricular materials for the purpose of history lessons, would probably 
violate the Speech Clause right.  Speech Clause analysis of such conduct would require inquiry 
into the message school officials intended to convey by purposefully displaying the flag. However, 
regardless of the phrasing of the message (i.e., "recognition of the South's historical traditions," 
"remembrance of those who died in the Civil War," "long live Dixie," or some other formulation) 
the association of the school with the symbolism of the flag would probably evince intentional 
inculcation of racist values. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
107 Brown v. Board of Educ. 347, U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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sponsoring the flag. 108 Although the Court in Adrarand was careful to point out that it applied 
strict scrutiny to federal governmental conduct using race as an explicit classification, 109 it is 
clear that facially race-neutral governmental conduct motivated by a discriminatory purpose 
must also meet the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.  This ensures consistency with the 
Croson standard that the Equal Protection Clause requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action 
by state and local government.110 Adarand does not preclude granting group protection under the 
insular and discrete minority group rationale, but the group-rights theory must yield to the 
individual right to be protected against race-based state conduct in the absence of a compelling 
state interest.111  Today, at a minimum, the equal protection of the law for all intentional 
governmental conduct, which burdens a single person with the race-based state action of flying 
the Confederate flag, is immediately suspect and courts are obligated to subject the conduct to 
the most rigid scrutiny.112 
Any person, regardless of racial group identity such as African-American, white, 
Hispanic, or Asian-American, is entitled to the equal protection of the law on an individual basis 
rather than based on his or her group status.113  In Hunt, the court committed a fundamental error 
                                                                 
108Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  “We note, incidentally, that this case concerns only 
classifications based explicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although 
facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory 
purpose.”  Id. at 213 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 297 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
109 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213. 
110 Id. at 222; see also  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,  488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
111 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
112 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (approving race-based exclusion of people of Japanese 
ancestry under its strict scrutiny standard). 
113 As stated in the syllabus of Adarand: 
Most federal agency contracts require a subcontractor compensation clause, which gives a prime 
contractor a financial incentive to hire subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by 
socially and economically disadvantaged, people and requires the contractor to presume that such 
people include minorities or any other person found to be disadvantaged by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).  The prime contractor under a federal highway construction contract 
containing such a clause awarded a subcontract to a company that was certified as a small 
disadvantaged business.  The record does not reveal how the company obtained its certification, 
but it could have been by any one of three methods: under one of two SBA programs – known as 
16
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by suggesting that Alabama’s flying the Confederate flag over its state capitol did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because the flag offends members of all racial groups equally.114  It is 
the Hunt Court’s suggestion that if only African-Americans were offended by the race-based 
message of the Confederate flag it might violate the Equal Protection Clause.115  The level of 
offense necessary to violate the Equal Protection Clause should not change depending upon 
whether or not the governmental conduct also offends “a group that has not been subject to 
governmental discrimination.”116 Under Adarand, if only one member of any racial group is 
offended by the state’s race-based conduct of displaying the flag as a symbol, it violates the 
equal protection of the law. 117  The rationale used by the Hunt Court involving the equal racial 
offensiveness to both blacks and whites of the Confederate flag as a basis for justifying race-
based conduct by the state was used before this country made a compelling commitment to racial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the 8(a) and 8(d) programs – or by a state agency under relevant Department of Transportation 
regulations. Adarand Constructors, Inc., which submitted the low bid on the subcontract but was 
not a certified business, filed suit against federal officials, claiming that the race-based 
presumptions used in subcontractor compensation clauses violate the equal protection component 
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.  
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200. 
114 NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990). 
115 Id. 
116 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) The issue in Wygant was whether a school board 
could adopt a race-based preference in determining governmental policy against a group that has not been 
historically subject to governmental discrimination. The Court held that such a policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id. at 267. The court recognized “that the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged 
classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.” Id. at 
273. 
117 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  It is a basic principle of law that the “Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups.”  Id.  The Court stated that: 
[i]t follows from that principle that all governmental action based on race – a group classification 
long recognized as "in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited," should be 
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the 
laws has not been infringed.  These ideas have long been central to this Court's understanding of 
equal protection, and holding "benign" state and federal racial classifications to different standards 
does not square with them.  “[a] free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality,” should tolerate no retreat from the principle that government may treat people 
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons.  Accordingly, we hold 
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental 
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  In other words, such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests.   
17
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equality.118 Tony Pace, an African-American male, and Mary Cox, a white woman, each 
received a two-year sentence for having a sexual relationship while living together.119  In 1883, 
the Supreme Court rejected Pace’s argument that the Alabama law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because integrated sexual relationships suffered harsher penalties than same-race sexual 
relationships. The Court upheld the Alabama law because Pace, an African-American male and 
Cox, a white female, could suffer the same penalties.120  In a 1964 opinion involving a Florida 
law that made it unlawful for racially integrated couples to live together, the Supreme Court 
overruled Pace and held such a race-based restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause.121 
The Supreme Court properly overruled Pace because “Pace represents a limited view of the 
Equal Protection Clause . . . [and] has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this 
court.”122  
Like Pace, the Hunt decision represents a narrow view of the Equal Protection Clause 
and cannot withstand strict scrutiny analysis because South Carolina’s decision to sponsor the 
flag is race-based and could not properly be characterized as a narrowly tailored remedial 
governmental action. 123 South Carolina began its official celebration of the Confederate flag in 
1962 during a time when many white Southerners were resisting the end of Jim Crow Laws with 
police dogs and much worse.124 Traditionally, governments fly flags to endorse or approve what 
is symbolized, and not to provide history lessons.125 Symbols may communicate many meanings 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
118 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
119 Id.   
120 Id. at 585. 
121 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
122 Id. at 188. 
123 See Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); see also  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 541 
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
124 Fein, supra  note 15, at A13. 
125 Id. 
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in a diverse American society. 126 The primary message communicated to blacks and whites in 
their individual lives by the state’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag is an ideological homage 
to slavery or racial inferiority, similar to the insult to Roman Catholics conveyed by a portrait of 
the Virgin Mary with elephant dung on her breast.127  In Croson, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based actions by state and local 
governments.128  
In Croson, the Court established three basic principles of skepticism, consistency, and 
congruence concerning governmental race-based classifications.129 Under skepticism, the Court 
requires preferences based on racial or ethnic criteria to be inherently suspect under the strict 
scrutiny test.130  The Court should be skeptical of a state’s sponsorship of the Confederate flag 
because it has become a widely used symbol for white supremacy. 131  According to Robert J. 
Bein, a government’s display of the Confederate flag will have profound equal protection 
implications under the Fourteenth Amendment.132 When a symbol such as the Confederate flag 
represents a message of exclusion based on race, it creates a healthy degree of skepticism about 
the excluded member’s participation in public life.133 Under the Court’s skepticism rationale, any 
state action such as the sponsorship of a Confederate flag, which intentionally impacts a person 
differently in public life because of his race, is inherently suspect.134 Those who argue that the 
                                                                 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222; see also  Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
129 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995). 
130 Id. at 223; see also  Wygant v. Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).  
131 Glanton, supra  note 3, at 1.  Glanton has noted that: 
In the 134 years since the Confederate battle flag fell in defeat, it has served as one of the most 
contentious symbols of the Old South, still dividing those who believe in the values it stood for 
and those who do not.  While it been used throughout history to observe the sacrifices made in 
support of the Confederacy, it also has become a widely used symbol of white supremacy. 
Id. 
132 Robert J. Bein, Stained Flags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 897, 900 (1998).  
133 Id. at 913. 
134 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223; see also  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
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confederate flag represents white Southern pride must remember that under the Court’s 
skepticism approach distinctions based on ancestry are constitutionally suspect.135  
It is common knowledge that, between 1877 and the 1960s, the Confederate battle flag 
served as a symbol of the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens Councils, as well as a symbol of the 
“Lost Cause.”136 The Court should view with skepticism any race-neutral southern pride 
justification for state sponsorship of the Confederate flag. 137 Suspect skepticism is appropriate 
because old news reels show Ku Klux Klan figures carrying the flag as well as people waving 
that flag while screaming obscenities in front of Central High School in Little Rock to protest 
school desegregation. 138  There are some people today who revere the Confederate battle flag 
because it tells the world that they are proud racists.139  These racists have usurped any legitimate 
use of the flag as a symbol of the respect that white southerners have for their ancestors and the 
suffering they endured.140 A proud southern white woman from Virginia wishes she could look 
at the Confederate battle flag and not see a racist symbol, but she cannot.141 The forces of racism 
have turned the Confederate flag into a symbol of blatant hate.142 
Some people apparently believe that Southern heritage and the Confederate flag are 
ethnic symbols for whites only and that others should tolerate under the pretense that these 
symbols are race-neutral. 143 The Confederate flag “is a symbol for people who want to proclaim 
                                                                 
135 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24; see also  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943). 
136 Owens, supra  note 1, at A7. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Owens, supra  note 1, at A7. 
143 Glanton, supra  note 3, at 1 (“‘What we have is an ethnic cleansing of Confederate symbols in America,’ 
according to Kirk Lyons, an attorney for the Southern Legal Resource Center in Black Mountain, N.C.  ‘There’s a 
problem when the government tries to pick and choose what our symbols can and cannot be.’”).  
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 34 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss2/2
 21
their Southern heritage.”144  An African-American born and reared in Mississippi also has the 
right to proclaim, “I too am a Southerner.” African-Americans have a Southern heritage and 
legacy in Southern states. Attorney Kirk Lyons asks all people to be tolerant of the Confederate 
flag as a celebration of Southern heritage.145 The Confederate flag cannot symbolize a love of 
heritage because there is too much racial baggage attached to it.146 Owens believes that the 
Confederate flag should be tolerated “inside of museums, the meeting rooms of Sons of 
Confederate Veterans . . . and . . . [at] re-enactment battlefields.”147  It is one thing to tolerate an 
individual’s unwise private display of the Confederate flag as a symbol of white supremacy, but 
it is another thing to tolerate a state flying a Confederate flag that represents white supremacy. 148 
Under the Supreme Court’s skepticism approach to race- inspired governmental conduct 
articulated in Adarand, a Confederate flag flying over public property based on the ethnic criteria 
of white Southern pride is illegal as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause strict judicial 
scrutiny requirement.149  
 Race-based governmental conduct must meet the consistency prong of Croson in order to 
survive an equal protection challenge.150 Under the consistency test, the standard of review under 
the Equal Protection Clause does not depend on those burdened or benefited by the state’s 
                                                                 
144 Id.  
145 Id.  According to Kirk Lyons, who refers to Southern Legal Resource Center as the ACLU for the Confederate 
flag: 
This is a symbol for people who want to proclaim their Southern heritage. If some people are 
offended by that, they have a right to be.  But they also have to show toleration for the symbol and 
respect the rights of those who want to display it. That’s what living in a free and diverse society 
is all about.” 
Id.  
146 Owens, supra  note 1, at A7.  
147 Id. 
148Moose Lodge v. Irvis,  407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to private 
race-based discrimination by a private lodge).  
149 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995). 
150 Id. at 224.  
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conduct.151 A state cannot fly its race-based Confederate flag over public buildings without 
meeting the strict scrutiny test, regardless of whether the act was designed to benefit or burden a 
particular group.152 As a race-based symbol for the benefit of those who wish to proudly observe 
the past legacy of their exclusive white Southern heritage, the state’s sponsorship of the 
Confederate flag violates the Equal Protection Clause if it cannot survive strict scrutiny. 153  In 
defense of South Carolina’s flying the Confederate flag over its state capitol, Jane Murray Wells, 
the President General of the 27,000-member United Daughters of the Confederacy, said, “We 
live in the past here [in South Carolina], and we like it that way.”154 “We still use our dishes, 
china, and silverware from the Confederacy days.  We don’t want anything taken from us.”155  
According to Earl Shinhoster, the former Southeast regional director and national director of the 
NAACP, when the Confederate battle flag flies, it gives sustenance as a symbol of defiance, a 
symbol of secession and all that characterized the war between the states.156  In order to benefit 
those who like to live in past days of the Confederacy and of slavery, South Carolina flies the 
Confederate flag under the color of state law, while violating the requirement of consistency 
under the Equal Protection Clause.157  
The principle of consistency is implicated when the government treats a person unequally 
because of her race; that person has suffered injury under both the language and spirit of the 
equal protection guarantee.158 Consistency recognizes that any individual suffers an injury when 
                                                                 
151 Id.; see also  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion);  id. at 520 (Scalia, J., 
concurring);  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).  
152 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 246. 
153 Id. 
154 Glanton, supra  note 3. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995).  All race-based conduct of governmental actors must 
be strictly scrutinized.  Id. 
158 Id. at 230. 
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she is disadvantaged because of the government’s raced-based conduct.159 The Confederate flag 
causes injury because it is a race-based symbol which sends a message of race-based exclusion 
rather than inclusion. 160  The race-based message of exclusion will give an individual “a sense of 
physical vulnerability, alienation, and displacement”161 because of the state’s race-based display 
of the Confederate flag.  A person suffers a constitutional injury when the state, as a 
representative of all the people, displays a race-based Confederate flag as a public symbol that 
treats an individual unequally because it is not administered evenhandedly and because it 
excludes any notion of race-neutrality.162 The principle of consistency requires public symbols to 
be race-neutral unless there is a compelling governmental interest that justifies the infliction of a 
racially motivated injury. 163 Any hope that the passage of time would allow the Confederate 
battle flag to be a symbol of a heritage, instead of a sign of racism, was lost in the period after 
the Compromise of 1877.164 Under the Compromise, federal troops were removed from the 
South and tacit approval was given to the second enslavement of African-Americans through Jim 
Crow laws, the loss of voting privileges, race-based segregation, and economic subjugation. 165 
The Confederate flag was lost forever as a race-neutral symbol when the forces of racism used it 
for so many years to continue the violence and intimidation what could not be won on the Civil 
                                                                 
159 Id. 
160 Bein, supra note 132, at 913. 
161 Id. at 916. (citing LAUREN BERLANT , THE ANATOMY OF NATIONAL FANTASY: HAWTHORNE, UTOPIA, AND 
EVERYDAY LIFE 24 (1991)). 
162 Id. at 916.  Bein notes that: 
State display of a public symbol sets up a complex interrelationship of state, symbol, and citizen.  
The identity of each, and its past relationship with the others, will powerfully influence the 
interplay among the three.  In a nation based on the principle that the citizens are – at a 
fundamental level – the state, public symbols must function in an evenhanded and inclusive 
manner if they are to treat all citizens equally. 
Id. 
163 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995). 
164 Owens, supra  note 1, at A7. 
165 Id. 
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War battlefield.166 “Certain flags teach, and teach powerfully. That is why Germany prohibits the 
display of the Nazi flag, which its leaders reasonably fear would foster neo-Nazism. The 
Confederate flag is no less an incendiary teacher.”167 Understanding the Confederate flag’s  
power as a lesson of racial inferiority and slavery is neither whimsical nor paranoid.168 The 
historical record fails to support the contention that the Confederacy was about states’ rights 
rather than slavery. 169 Slave states that seceded wanted more federal muscle to enforce the 
Fugitive Slave Act and to exclude abolitionist literature in the mails.170 President Lincoln was 
elected on a platform based on respecting a state’s right to decide for itself the issue of slavery, 
but Lincoln opposed extending slavery to the territories of the United States.171 The primary 
complaint of the Confederate States of America was the federal government’s failure to 
guarantee an indefinite preservation of slave power.172 The slave power of the Confederacy was 
beginning to erode through condemning moral sentiment and the probable admission of new 
non-slaves as the United States expanded across the North American continent.173 At the end of 
the day, to conclude that South Carolina’s official flying of the Confederate flag communicates 
to ordinary Americans sympathy with slavery, Jim Crow Laws, or the African-American 
subservience is inescapable.174 South Carolina’s flying of the flag fosters a climate of racism. 175 
South Carolina’s flying of the Confederate flag violates the Equal Protection Clause because 
creating a climate of racism is race-based governmental conduct that cannot be justified under 
                                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Fein, supra  note 15, at A13. 
168 Id. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Fein, supra  note 15, at A13. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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the strict scrutiny test articulated in Croson.176 At an absolute minimum, a state flying the 
Confederate flag over its public buildings has created an unconstitutional presumption that there 
is a preference given to the descendants of white slave owners at the expense of race-neutral 
governmental conduct.177 In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that state-sponsored, race-based 
presumptions are unconstitutional if they fail the strict scrutiny test.178 State-sponsored race-
based presumptions and classifications are constitutional only if the state action is narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.179 
 Under the Supreme Court’s congruence standard announced in Adarand, the equal 
protection obligations imposed on the federal government by the Fifth Amendment and on the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment are indistinguishable.180 If the federal government were to 
fly the Confederate flag over the nation’s capitol, it would have to meet the strict scrutiny test.181 
A Confederate flag flying over the nation’s capitol would create “a climate of racism, every bit 
as much as President Wilson’s premier viewing of the racist film, ‘Birth of a Nation,’ in the 
White House.” 182  
 
IV. HOW THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONFEDERATE FLAG IN COLEMAN V. MILLER FAILS THE ADARAND 
STANDARD 
 
In Coleman v. Miller,183 James Coleman, an African-American man, sued to enjoin the 
flying of the Georgia state flag over public office buildings.184 Coleman alleged that that the 
                                                                 
176 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  In Croson, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires strict scrutiny of race-based governmental action.  Id. 
177 See Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
178 Id. at 227. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 217. 
181 Id. 
182 Fein, supra  note 15, at A13. 
183 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 528 (11th Cir. 1997). 
184 Id.  The Court, discussing the history of the Georgia flag, noted that: 
25
Weeden: Confederate Flag and Equal Protection Clause
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 26
flying of the Georgia flag, which incorporates the Confederate battle flag emblem, violates his 
constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause.185 The current official flag of the state of 
Georgia was designed in 1956 during a historical period when public leaders were implementing 
a large campaign of resistance to Supreme Court decisions approving school desegregation. 186 
After many of Georgia’s politicians openly resisted the United States Supreme Court’s 
desegregation rulings, many white Southerners demonstrated their Confederate heritage with 
open hostility to the Supreme Court’s pro-desegregation civil rights rulings.187  In 1956, in an 
environment of racial hostility toward African-Americans and other racial minorities, the 
Georgia General Assembly chose as an official state symbol an emblem that had historically 
been associated with white supremacy and resistance to federal desegregation authority. 188 From 
a historical perspective, Professor Dan Carter, a professor of Southern History at Emory 
University, said, “by the mid-1950s, the Confederate battle flag had become the single most 
important symbol of white supremacy and defiant opposition to federally mandated laws on non-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
In 1879, Georgia adopted as its first official flag a variation of the Confederate national flag 
consisting of three horizontal red and white stripes and one blue vertical band. The General 
Assembly added the state seal to this flag in 1902, and this combination of the Confederate 
national flag emblem and the Georgia state seal remained the official flag of Georgia until the 
current flag design was adopted in 1956.  The 1956 flag statute replaced the Confederate national 
flag emblem with the Confederate battle flag emblem, which is commonly referred to as the St. 
Andrew's Cross. The red and blue St. Andrew's Cross, which the Confederate troops carried 
during the Civil War, now covers two-thirds of the Georgia flag, and the state seal containing the 
words "Wisdom, Justice and Moderation" covers the remaining third.  
Id.  (citation omitted)  Before 1879, Georgia militia units carried an unofficial state flag that consisted of the state 
seal emblazoned in the center of a blue background.  Id. at 528 n.1. 
185 Id. at 528. 
186 Id.  The court also noted that: 
In the 1956 state of the State address, then-Governor Marvin Griffin declared that "there will be no 
mixing of the races in public schools, in college classrooms in Georgia as long as I am Governor."  
Later, while addressing the States' Rights Council of Ge orgia at the beginning of the 1956 
legislative session, Governor Griffin announced that "the rest of the nation is looking to Georgia 
for the lead in segregation."  The 1956 General Assembly passed several bills and resolutions as 
part of its resistance package, including the Interposition Resolution declaring the Supreme Court's 
school desegregation rulings in  Brown I and  Brown II null and void.  Introduced as the General 
Assembly was considering the flag bill, the Interposition Resolution passed both houses over a 
single dissent. 
Id. 
187 Id. 
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discrimination.”189 Professor Carter believes that the Georgia General Assembly incorporated the 
Confederate battle flag design into its official flag as a symbolic bolster to the morale of those 
Georgians struggling to maintain white supremacy. 190 The federal appellate court erred in 
concluding that the Confederate flag adopted by Georgia in 1956 was a facially neutral 
symbol. 191 The Confederate flag was adopted because it was understood by white Southerners in 
Georgia and elsewhere to be a symbol of white supremacy for those who had not given up on the 
lost cause of discriminating against African-Americans.192 Because Coleman conceded that the 
Confederate flag was a neutral symbol on its face, the appellate court required him to satisfy a 
two-prong test.193  Coleman first had to demonstrate that flying of the Georgia flag produced 
disproportionate effects along racial lines and, second, that racial discrimination was a 
substantial or motivating factor behind the legislature’s adoption of the flag as a symbol. 194   
The federal appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision because Coleman failed 
to produce sufficient evidence to establish his claim of disproportionate racial impact on African-
Americans as a group.195 In order to prove disproportionate impact on a particular racial group, a 
plaintiff must present specific factual evidence to demonstrate that a state’s current sponsorship 
of the Confederate flag presently imposes on African-Americans as a group a measurable 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
188 Id. 
189 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 529 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997). 
190 Id. at 529. 
191 Id. 
192 Id.  According to one commentator: 
Some maintain that South Carolina's official devotion to the Confederate flag, at least in the year 
2000, honors the heroism, courage, and suffering of many Confederate soldiers and their families. 
That may be true, but it does not disprove that an equally if not more potent companion message is 
white supremacy, which is what the soldiers were fighting for. No doubt, countless soldiers in 
Hitler's Waffen SS likewise displayed bravery and sacrifice in World War II, but that did not make 
President Ronald Reagan's ill-starred visit to their burial sites at Bitburg any less offensive to 
Jews. 
Fein, supra note 15, at A13. 
193 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 529. 
194 Id. 
195 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 529 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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burden, or that it denies them an identifiable benefit.196  The significant ghost and spirit of 
Adarand is the bold and unflagging declaration that the equal protection of the law applies to 
individuals and not to groups.197 Any person who is offended by the state’s sponsorship of the 
explicitly race-based symbolism of the Confederate flag does not have to seek equal protection 
relief under a disparate-effect theory because of Adarand’s personal right theory of equal 
protection where discriminatory intent exists.198 The Court in Coleman should have analyzed the 
Confederate flag issue according to a discriminatory intent theory rather than according to a 
discriminatory impact theory because of the holding in Adarand.199 Professor Carter’s testimony 
presented evidence of discriminatory intent when the Georgia legislature incorporated the 
Confederate battle flag into its state flag as a race-based symbol of resistance to the Supreme 
Court’s civil rights rulings expanding the civil rights of African-Americans.200  James MacKay, a 
member of the 1956 Georgia legislature that incorporated the Confederate battle flag into the 
state flag, testified tha t there was a movement in Georgia and across the South to adopt the 
Confederate battle flag as a symbol of resistance to the law of the land requiring integration. 201 
Because the equal protection of the law is a personal right, and not a group right, it is improper 
for a court to grant a motion for summary judgment without considering the personal impact of 
intentional racial discrimination on a single plaintiff.202 Evidence that race was a motivating 
factor in the state’s decision to sponsor the Confederate flag and that the decision impacted a 
single individual makes it improper to dismiss a suit for lack of reasonable facts to conclude that 
                                                                 
196 Id. at 530. 
197 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 529 n.5.  
201 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 529 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). 
202 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.  
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the state has violated that individual’s personal equal protection rights.203  Because an African-
American plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently imposes a group-based 
disparate racial impact, the Court did not use the rationale of Adarand because it refused to 
consider whether there was evidence that race was a motivating factor in the passage of 
Georgia’s Confederate flag legislation. 204 Under Adarand’s personal equal protection rationale, a 
court should consider evidence of discriminatory intent regardless of whether the race-based 
governmental decision impacts a discrete and insular minority group or a single person. 205 
In a post-Adarand era, the disparate- impact remedy utilized in Hunter in 1985, ten years 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand, is not the proper theory of the case when any 
individual shows discriminatory intent and harm caused by a state’s decision to sponsor the 
Confederate battle flag. 206   
The lower federal court in Coleman v. Miller may have reached a different result in 
analyzing the appellant’s evidence of discriminatory treatment under the personalized 
discriminatory intent required under the equal protection standards outlined in Adarand.207  It is 
conceded that appellant Coleman’s testimony was not adequate to demonstrate a 
disproportionate racial effect.208 Coleman “testified that the Confederate symbol in Georgia 
places him in imminent fear of lawlessness and violence and that an African-American friend of 
his, upon seeing the Georgia flag in a courtroom, decided to plead guilty rather litigate a traffic 
ticket.”209 After carefully reviewing the record and drawing all inferences in the light most 
                                                                 
203 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530.  
204 Id. at 530 n.8. 
205 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
206 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530 (“In order to demonstrate disproportionate impact along racial lines, appellant must 
present specific factual evidence to demonstrate that the Georgia flag presently imposes on African-Americans as a 
group a measurable burden or denies them an identifiable benefit.”). 
207 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997); see also  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
208 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530. 
209 Id. 
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favorable to Coleman, his testimony reveals evidence of injury caused by the state’s use of an 
explicitly race-based symbol in the Georgia flag under Adarand’s personal equal protection 
remedy. 210 Based on the decision in Adarand, a cour t cannot force a person who complains of the 
personal and harmful impact of intentional race-based discrimination into the disparate-impact 
group remedy utilized in Hunter.211  A court applying the Adarand rule, that equal protection is 
for the benefit of individuals rather than groups, would refuse to grant the state a motion for 
summary judgment after reviewing the evidence in Coleman.212 The motion for summary 
judgment should be denied because there are genuine issues of material fact concerning 
discriminatory intent and personal injury under the Adarand rationale that preclude judgment as 
a matter of law for the state as the moving party. 213  
The court in Coleman concluded that the failure to demonstrate that the Georgia flag 
presently imposes a group based racial discriminatory effect relieves it of the burden to decide 
whether racial discrimination against African-Americans was a motivating factor in the flag 
decision and is inconsistent with protecting individuals under the Equal Protection Clause.214 To 
the extent that Palmer v. Thompson215 is understood as standing for the proposition that race-
motivated legislation only violates the Constitution when it affects blacks and whites differently 
as a group, that proposition has been seriously undermined by Adarand’s proposition that the 
Equal Protection Clause protects individuals and not groups.216 Under Adarand, whenever race is 
a factor in a governmental decision, the proper inquiry is whether there was an intent to 
                                                                 
210 Id.; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
211 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also  Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 
(1985). 
212 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530.  The Court stated that “[a]fter carefully reviewing the record, and drawing all 
inferences in the light most favorable to appellant [Coleman], we find no evidence of a similar discriminatory 
impact imposed by the Georgia flag.”  Id. 
213 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
214 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 531 n.8. 
215 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). 
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discriminate.  When intentional discrimination exists, the next question becomes whether the 
discrimination is narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny. 217 As Justice Stewart stated 
in the Fullilove decision, under our Constitution, any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race is inherently suspect and presumed to be invalid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.218 There is nothing new about the notion that states may treat people 
differently because of their race only for compelling reasons.219 In Coleman, there were genuine 
issues of material fact concerning whether Georgia incorporated the Confederate battle flag into 
its state flag because of its desire to treat individuals differently based on their individual racial 
status, regardless of their group status.220  People of color with visible Afrocentric traits, 
regardless of their national origin group status, would have been discriminated against by the 
historical supporters of the Georgia flag because of their individual racial status regardless of 
whether they were Jewish, Greek, or British. The Coleman Court’s grant of summary judgment 
to the state because an African-American showed individualized racial harm rather than group 
harm lacks support in Supreme Court precedent and undermines the fundamental principle of 
equal protection as a personal right.221 If the Coleman Court had not boxed the appellant into an 
all-or-nothing group equal protection remedy, it would have recognized that there were material 
issues of fact as to whether the legislature’s adoption of the Georgia flag was intended to 
encourage private discrimination against any individual. 222 The Court concluded that there was 
no evidence in the record that connects the Georgia flag to private discrimination or racial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
216 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.  
217 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 234 (1995). 
218 Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 n.1 (1980)). 
219 Id. at 235. 
220 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 529 (11th Cir. 1997). 
221 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235. 
222 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530 n.6.  The Court noted that “[w]e recognize that a government may in some instances 
violate the Constitution because it encourages private discrimination.” Id.; see also  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369, 380 (1967). 
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violence that would satisfy its disproportionate racial group effect requirement.223 There was 
sufficient evidence in the record from Professor Carter’s testimony to create a material issue of 
fact as to whether Georgia incorporated the Confederate battle flag to help the morale of those 
Georgians struggling to maintain white supremacy against individuals rather than groups.224 
 
V.  STATE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CONFEDERATE FLAG VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
 
 
The judges in Coleman expressed regret that the Georgia legislature chose to and 
continues to display, as an official symbol, a Confederate battle flag that represents division 
rather than unity. 225 But the Court stated that, “[a]s judges, however, we are entrusted only to 
examine the controversies and facts put before us.”226 When a judge considers the racial 
implications of a state sponsorship of the Confederate flag, she may find insightful Professor 
Laurence Tribe’s comments about the ability of federal courts to award relief in contexts in 
which there is an operational challenge to the actual practice of a governmental policy. 227 Even if 
the Georgia law incorporating the Confederate battle flag could not be shown to be either invalid 
on its face or invalid as applied to the appellant challenging it, the law may operate in actual 
practice in an unconstitut ional manner.228 The constitutional vice or constitutional evil in an 
actual operative practice theory inheres not in any one law either on its face or as applied, but in 
a constellation of laws or governmental policies that work in concert to deprive people of their 
                                                                 
223 Coleman, 117 F.3d at 530. 
224 Id. at 529 n.5. 
225 Id. at 530. 
226 Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527, 530 (11th Cir. 1997). 
227 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-31, at 609-10 (3d ed. 2000). 
228 Id. at 612. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick,  487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (“This litigation 
raises somewhat unusual questions involving a facially valid statute that appears to have been administered in a way 
that led to violations of the Establishment Clause.”). 
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individual rights.229 When the constitutional objection is of that character, it is inexcusably 
arbitrary for the federal courts to shut their eyes to a litigant’s challenge.230 It is arbitrary for 
federal courts to shut their doors to requests for suitable relief because the constitutional 
challenge fails to fit standard pigeonholes for attacks on the facial validity of a law and for 
attacks on the validity of a law as applied to the litigant’s situation. 231  The Confederate battle 
flag violates the Equal Protection Clause because, when it is sponsored by the state, it operates in 
actual practice as a race-based symbol to support a constellation of laws, governmental policies, 
and private practices that conspire to deny people their personal constitutional rights, which 
violates the Court’s holding in Adarand. 232 
 One commentator believes that the law’s ignorance of its actual impact may serve as a 
severe threat to the basic civil liberties of all Americans.233 When justice is blind to the operative 
racial use of the Confederate flag, such as in Georgia and South Carolina, the rule of law runs the 
risk of being divorced from the real world.234 It is a self-evident truth that the standards of 
constitutionality should be informed by empirical data.235  The Confederate battle flag is not a 
symbol that is racially neutral on its face. A state flag law that appears neutral on its face 
warrants strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause if it can be proved that the law 
incorporating the Confederate flag was motivated by a racial purpose, or if it is unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.236 In situations where there is a genuine issue of material fact relating to 
                                                                 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).  
233 Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 
U. PA. L. REV. 655, 656-57 (1988).  
234 Id. at 657. 
235 Id. 
236 Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999). Strict scrutiny applies to a law neutral on its face motivated by a 
racial purpose or object. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995). Strict scrutiny is required when a plaintiff 
challenges a facially neutral law that is unexplainable on grounds other than race. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 
(1993).   
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whether a state legislature drew a congressional redistricting plan based on impermissible racial 
motives, a court is precluded from granting a summary judgment on the claim that the plan 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.237  In Coleman, there were issues of material fact relating to 
the nature of the appellant’s personal equal protection injury, as recognized by the court in 
Adarand.238 There were also issues of material fact in Coleman as to the legislature’s motivation 
in adopting the flag law. 239 Under the Shaw v. Reno rationale, there was also an issue of fact in 
Coleman about whether Georgia’s use of the Confederate flag can be explained on grounds other 
than race.240 
 The Confederate battle flag is a provocative symbol that appeals to a prurient interest in 
race relations because, taken as a whole, the flag portrays racial issues in a patently offensive 
way.241  Although one may not be able to objectively define such an offensive symbol, “[b]ut 
[we] know it when [we] see it.”242  The spirit of Adarand clearly suggests that a state’s 
sponsorship of a flag, which appeals to a prurient interest in race relations, violates the equal 
protection of the law if a member of a minority class can show that she has suffered an injury 
regardless of her group status.243  Because of its appeal to a prurient interest in race relations, the 
Confederate flag is “the most inflammatory symbol that the South has.”244 When a plaque 
bearing the Confederate battle flag was removed from the Texas Supreme Court building on 
Friday June 9, 2000, it generated predictable words of passion. 245 The removal of this plaque has 
                                                                 
237 Hunt, 526 U.S. at 549. 
238 See Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997). 
239 See id. 
240 See id. See generally Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644. 
241 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller is an obscenity case in which the Court holds that a state may 
prohibit materials which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex. Id. 
242 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
243 Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).  
244 Bein, supra  note 132, at 921 (quoting Kevin Sack, Symbols of the Old South Divides the New South, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 1996, at 5).  
245 Duggan, supra  note 21, at A21.  Mr. Duggan has noted that: 
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won Governor Bush praise from the Texas NAACP, but it has angered groups that are dedicated 
to preserving the Confederate heritage.246 Texas NAACP president Gary Bledsoe was heartened 
by the news that the Confederate battle flag symbol, which he describes as a hate symbol, was 
removed from the Texas Supreme Court.247  Kirk Lyons of the Southern Legal Resource Center 
accused Governor Bush of waging war on the Confederate community because of the removal of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Responding to complaints from civil rights advocates, Texas Governor George W. Bush's 
administration has removed two Confederate memorial plaques from the state Supreme Court 
building here, winning praise from the Texas NAACP but angering groups dedicated to preserving 
Southern heritage.  
The bronze, square-foot plaques – including one bearing an image of the controversial 
Confederate battle flag – had adorned the Supreme Court lobby since 1955, after the building was 
constructed with money once set aside in a Confederate widows' pension fund. The state agency 
that manages the building said it decided to take down the plaques last Friday after receiving 
"extensive input from the governor's office.”  
"The plaques were replaced with two others, one commemorating the source of the 
building's financing and one extolling the principle of equal justice for all citizens ‘regardless of 
race, creed or color.’"  
"These replacement plaques will help assure all Texans that our courts provide fair and 
impartial justice while explaining the role Confederate family contributions played in constructing 
the building," Bush spokesman Mike Jones said in a statement today.  
Bush, the presumptive GOP presidential nominee, tried to steer clear of a much larger 
controversy over the Confederate battle flag flying over the South Carolina Statehouse, which is 
due to be removed July 1. Asked repeatedly before that state's primary in February whether he 
sides with Confederate heritage groups or South Carolinians who are offended by the symbol, 
Bush ducked by calling it a local issue best decided by the people of South Carolina.  
But the plaques in the Supreme Court lobby here were just a short stroll from Bush's 
office in the Texas Capitol. After the Texas NAACP began pressing for their removal in January, 
Bush said they should remain, albeit with a new plaque explaining that the building was paid for 
with money from the Confederate pension fund. The law that allowed for that financing required 
the building to be "designated as a memorial" to Texans who fought for the South in the Civil 
War.  
The explanatory plaque went up--but the others came down. One bore a rendering of the 
battle flag and a quote from General Robert E. Lee, praising Texas troops under his command, and 
the other was a plaque of the Great Seal of the Confederacy. 
"We are heartened by the news that the hate symbols have been removed," said Texas 
NAACP president Gary Bledsoe, calling the plaques "an unnecessary stain on our judiciary."  
But among some groups, there was anger.  
"If the governor wants to wage war on the Confederate community, that's his choice, but 
it's not going to help him electorally," said lawyer Kirk Lyons of the South Carolina-based 
Southern Legal Resource Center. Seeking to retain the plaques, Lyons filed a lawsuit in state court 
on behalf of Denne A. Sweeny, commander of the Texas Division of the Sons of the Confederacy.  
Lyons and Sweeny said the financing law that required the building to be dedicated to 
Confederate veterans also required a commemorative display.”  
"I thought it was a pretty rotten thing to do," Sweeny said of the state General Services 
Commission's decision to remove the plaques Friday night. The agency said it chose that time so 
the work would not disrupt the court. 
Id. 
246 Id. 
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the symbol.248 It was indeed good news that the Confederate battle flag flying over the South 
Carolina capitol was scheduled to come down on July 1, 2000.249 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A state violates the equal protection of the law when it endorses a Confederate battle flag 
symbol that conveys an ideological message that appeals to a prurient interest in race relations. It 
is a reality that political concerns may have influenced a state’s decision to do the right thing and 
stop sponsoring Confederate symbols. Regardless of the political climate, one’s personal right to 
be free of race-based symbolic flags is so precious that the judiciary must protect it when there is 
evidence of discriminatory state action that accommodates a private, prurient interest in race 
relations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
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